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ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
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Editorial Board
Editor
  • Federico Echenique
Coeditors
  • Mira Frick
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Rakesh Vohra
Associate Editors
  • Scott Ashworth
  • Sarah Auster
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Francis Bloch
  • Simon Board
  • Jaroslav Borovicka
  • Florian Brandl
  • Benjamin Brooks
  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Eduardo Davila
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Tommaso Denti
  • Laura Doval
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Alex Frankel
  • Yingni Guo
  • Kevin He
  • Benjamin Hébert
  • Johannes Hörner
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Vijay Krishna
  • Nicolas S. Lambert
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • Shengwu Li
  • Annie Liang
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Jay Lu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Moritz Meyer-ter-vehn
  • Ezra Oberfield
  • Marcin Pęski
  • John K.-H. Quah
  • Philipp Sadowski
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Uzi Segal
  • Ran Spiegler
  • Colin Stewart
  • Satoru Takahashi
  • Juuso Välimäki
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill
  • Alexander Westkamp
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 21, Issue 1 (January 2026)

Table of Contents

Articles

Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?
       Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1–21
Transparent matching mechanisms
       Markus Möller
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
22–43
Naive calibration
       Yair Antler and Benjamin Bachi
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
44–70
Markovian persuasion
       Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
71–98
Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
       Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, and Barton L. Lipman
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
99–131
Coordination with sequential information acquisition
       Xiaoye Liao and Michal Szkup
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
132–166
Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability
       Boli Xu
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
167–203
Bayesian games with nested information
       Royi Jacobovic, Yehuda John Levy, and Eilon Solan
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
204–240
Chaos and unpredictability with time inconsistent policy makers
       Marco Battaglini
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
241–280
Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection
       Navin Kartik and Weijie Zhong
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
281–324
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1406 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Alp Atakan, Michael Richter, and Matan Tsur, Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets
  • Nicola Amendola, Luis Araujo, and Leo Ferraris, Physical vs digital currency: a difference that makes a difference
  • Anna M. Sanktjohanser, Optimally stubborn: how long to hold and who will fold?
  • Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, John K.-H. Quah, and Rui Tang, Coarse revealed preference (Supplementary appendix)
  • Aram Grigoryan, A continuum model as a limit of large finite matching markets
  • Rumen Kostadinov, Regret in durable-good monopoly
  • Yaron Azrieli and John N. Rehbeck, Marginal stochastic choice
  • Daehyun Kim and Ichiro Obara, Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games
  • Francesco Squintani, Strategic disclosure in networks
  • Michael Greinecker and Michael Andrew Nielsen, Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?: Correction
  • Maxwell Rosenthal, Simple incentives and diverse beliefs
  • Felix Kubler, Larry Selden, and Xiao Wei, Time consistency, temporal resolution indifference and the separation of time and risk (Supplementary appendix)
  • Teddy Mekonnen, How to segment a search market: information design and directed search

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