Volume 13, Number 3 (September 2018)

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Table of contents

Articles

Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
        Oihane Gallo and Elena Inarra
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933–950
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
        Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov
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951–978
Pareto efficiency and identity
        Christopher Phelan and Aldo Rustichini
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979–1008
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
        Lars Ehlers and Alexander Westkamp
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 Supplementary Appendix
1009–1042
Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter?
        Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, and Bram De Rock
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1043–1076
Competition and networks of collaboration
        Nikita Roketskiy
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1077–1110
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
        Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo
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 Supplementary Appendix
1111–1150
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
        David Martimort, Aggey Semenov, and Lars A. Stole
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1151–1190
Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
        Wojciech Olszewski and Mikhail Safronov
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1191–1232
Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
        Rahul Deb and Colin Stewart
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1233–1274
On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
        Gabriel Carroll
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1275–1318
The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
        Yuichiro Waki, Richard Dennis, and Ippei Fujiwara
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 Supplementary Appendix
1319–1368
A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity
        Guillaume Rocheteau, Pierre-Olivier Weill, and Russell Wong
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 Supplementary Appendix
1369–1424
A general solution method for moral hazard problems
        Rongzhu Ke and Christopher Thomas Ryan
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1425–1481
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from distinct IP addresses.