|
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–40 |
|
Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks
Daron Acemoglu, Kostas Bimpikis, and Asu Ozdaglar |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 41–97 |
|
Persuasion and dynamic communication
Itai Sher |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 99–136 |
|
On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 137–162 |
|
On the relationship between individual and group decisions
Joel Sobel |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 163–185 |
|
Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
Hannu Vartiainen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 187–216 |
|
Regular prices and sales
Paul Heidhues and Botond Koszegi |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 217–251 |
|
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, and Utku Unver |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 253–277 |
|
Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
Francesco Nava and Michele Piccione |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 279–312 |
|
An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 313–338 |
|
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
Tilman Börgers and Doug Smith |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 339–360 |
|
Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies
Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra, and Arunava Sen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 361–381 |
|
Stochastic stability in monotone economies
Takashi Kamihigashi and John Stachurski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 383–407 |
|
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 409–434 |
|
The transfer problem: A complete characterization
Yves Balasko |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 435–444 |
|
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Vincent Anesi and Daniel J. Seidmann |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 445–482 |
|
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
Ying Chen and Hülya Eraslan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 483–513 |
|
A dynamic theory of electoral competition
Marco Battaglini |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 515–554 |
|
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 555–582 |
|
Search with multi-worker firms
Daron Acemoglu and William B. Hawkins |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 583–628 |
|
Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population
Geir B. Asheim and Stephane Zuber |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 629–650 |
|
Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
Marcin Pęski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 651–694 |
|
Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications
Michael David König, Claudio J. Tessone, and Yves Zenou |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 695–752 |
|
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, and Lars-Gunnar Svensson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 753–777 |
|
Second order beliefs models of choice under imprecise risk: non-additive second order beliefs vs. nonlinear second order utility
Raphaël Giraud |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 779–816 |
|
Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 817–863 |
|
Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown
Julien Prat and Boyan Jovanovic |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 865–914 |
|
A ranking method based on handicaps
Gabrielle Demange |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 915–942 |