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Choice by lexicographic semiorders
Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 1–23 |
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An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
Marcin Pęski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 25–55 |
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Forward induction reasoning revisited
Pierpaolo Battigalli and Amanda Friedenberg |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 57–98 |
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Ashamed to be selfish
David Dillenberger and Philipp Sadowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 99–124 |
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Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects
Geoffroy de Clippel and Kfir Eliaz |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 125–162 |
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On the number of critical equilibria separating two equilibria
Yves Balasko |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 163–181 |
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Subjectivity in inductive inference
Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 183–215 |
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A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
Thomas Wiseman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 217–239 |
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Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
B. Ravikumar and Yuzhe Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 241–282 |
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Contract, renegotiation, and hold up: Results on the technology of trade and investment
Kristy Buzard and Joel Watson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 283–322 |
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Implementation with evidence
Navin Kartik and Olivier Tercieux |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 323–355 |
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Optimal deadlines for agreements
Ettore Damiano, Hao Li, and Wing Suen |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 357–393 |
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Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkilic, Hervé Moulin, and Jay Sethuraman |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 395–423 |
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A principal-agent model of sequential testing
Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 425–463 |
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Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments
Timofiy Mylovanov and Thomas E. Troger |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 465–488 |
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 489–533 |
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The ex-ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty
Leandro Nascimento |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 535–570 |
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Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Hector Chade and Edward E. Schlee |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 571–607 |
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Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Paul J. Healy and Laurent A. Mathevet |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 609–661 |
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Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods
Alexander Reffgen and Lars-Gunnar Svensson |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 663–688 |