Table of contents
Articles
|
Choosing on influence
Tugce Cuhadaroglu |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 477–492 |
|
General revealed preference theory
Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, and Eran Shmaya |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 493–511 |
|
Multinary group identification
Wonki Jo Cho and Biung-Ghi Ju |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 513–531 |
|
On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
Mohammed Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Haomiao Yu, and Yongchao Zhang |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 533–554 |
|
A theory of political gridlock
Juan Ortner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 555–586 |
|
One dimensional mechanism design
Hervé Moulin |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 587–619 |
|
Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs
Henrique de Oliveira, Tommaso Denti, Maximilian Mihm, and Kemal Ozbek |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 621–654 |
|
Social distance and network structures
Ryota Iijima and Yuichiro Kamada |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 655–689 |
|
Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 691–729 |
|
Competing with asking prices
Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers, and Ronald Wolthoff |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 731–770 |
|
Modeling infinitely many agents
Wei He, Xiang Sun, and Yeneng Sun |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW 771–815 |
|
Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs
Juan Ortner |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 817–861 |
|
Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
Daniel Fragiadakis and Peter Troyan |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 863–908 |
|
Magical thinking: A representation result
Brendan Daley and Philipp Sadowski |
Abstract
PRINT VIEW Supplementary Appendix 909–956 |