ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
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Editorial Board
Coeditors
    Gadi Barlevy
  • Faruk Gul
  • Johannes Hörner
  • Martin J. Osborne
       (Editor)
  • Nicola Persico
Associate Editors
    David Ahn
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Pierpaolo Battigalli
  • Ted Bergstrom
  • Simon Board
  • Sylvain Chassang
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Jeffrey C. Ely
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Douglas Gale
  • Veronica Guerrieri
  • Ian Jewitt
  • Kajii, Atsushi
  • Kandori, Michihiro
  • Narayana Kocherlakota
  • Igor Kopylov
  • David Knudsen Levine
  • Gilat Levy
  • Barton L. Lipman
  • George J. Mailath
  • David Martimort
  • Georg Nöldeke
  • Wojciech Olszewski
  • Michael Peters
  • Andrea Prat
  • Roy Radner
  • Arthur J. Robson
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • William H. Sandholm
  • Uzi Segal
  • Marciano Siniscalchi
  • Ran Spiegler
  • Jeroen M. Swinkels
  • Utku Ünver
  • Timothy P. Van Zandt
  • Thomas Wiseman
  • Mark L.J. Wright
  • Muhamet Yildiz
  • William R. Zame

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society three times a year, in January, May, and September. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 8, Issue 2 (May 2013)

Table of Contents

Articles

Expressible inspections Abstract PRINT VIEW
Tai Wei Hu and Eran Shmaya 263–280
Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasi-linear markets Abstract PRINT VIEW
Eduardo M. Azevedo, E. Glen Weyl, and Alexander White 281–290
Liquidity hoarding Abstract PRINT VIEW
Douglas Gale and Tanju Yorulmazer 291–324
Effective affirmative action in school choice Abstract PRINT VIEW
Isa Emin Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed Ali Yildirim 325–363
Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games Abstract PRINT VIEW
Steven A. Matthews 365–403
On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty Abstract PRINT VIEW
Antonio Penta 405–430
Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains Abstract PRINT VIEW
Debasis Mishra and Souvik Roy 431–466
Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions Abstract PRINT VIEW
Ignacio Esponda 467–501
Contingent preference for flexibility: eliciting beliefs from behavior Abstract PRINT VIEW
Philipp Sadowski 503–534
Pricing and investments in matching markets Abstract PRINT VIEW
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and Larry Samuelson 535–590
A wealth-requirement axiomatization of riskiness Abstract PRINT VIEW
Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart 591–620
Papers within each issue are ordered by the date of receipt of the final version.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 938 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

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Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard P. McLean, Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
  • Marco Battaglini, A dynamic theory of electoral competition
  • Ying Chen and Hulya Eraslan, Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information
  • Vincent Anesi and Daniel J. Seidmann, Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
  • Yves Balasko, The transfer problem: A complete characterization
  • Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya, Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
  • Takashi Kamihigashi and John Stachurski, Stochastic stability in monotone economies
  • Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra, and Arunava Sen, Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies
  • Tilman Börgers and Doug Smith, Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
  • Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov, An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
  • Francesco Nava and Michele Piccione, Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
  • Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, and M. Utku Ünver, Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
  • Paul Heidhues and Botond Koszegi, Regular prices and sales
  • Hannu Vartiainen, Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property
  • Joel Sobel, On the relationship between individual and group decisions
  • Christopher P. Chambers and Federico Echenique, On the consistency of data with bargaining theories
  • David Rahman, Surplus extraction on arbitrary type spaces
  • Itai Sher, Persuasion and dynamic communication
  • Daron Acemoglu, Kostas Bimpikis, and Asuman Ozdaglar, Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks
  • Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
  • George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan, Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
  • Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti, and Christopher J. Tyson, Two-stage threshold representations
  • Sung-Ha Hwang, Markos Katsoulakis, and Luc Rey-Bellet, Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games
  • Jeffrey C. Ely and Ron Siegel, Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets
  • Vadim Cherepavov, Timothy Feddersen, and Alvaro Sandroni, Rationalization
  • Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi, Specialization and partisanship in committee search
  • Michael Mandler, Endogenous indeterminacy and volatility of asset prices under ambiguity
  • Yusufcan Masatlioglu and Daisuke Nakajima, Choice by iterative search
  • Guillermo L. Ordoñez, Fragility of reputation and clustering of risk-taking
  • Kiminori Matsuyama, The good, the bad, and the ugly: An inquiry into the causes and nature of credit cycles

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