Volume 9, Number 2 (May 2014)

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Table of contents


An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
Dilip Abreu and Yuliy Sannikov 313–338
Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
Tilman Börgers and Doug Smith 339–360
Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra, and Arunava Sen 361–381
Stochastic stability in monotone economies Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
Takashi Kamihigashi and John Stachurski 383–407
Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
Riccardo Calcagno, Yuichiro Kamada, Stefano Lovo, and Takuo Sugaya 409–434
The transfer problem: A complete characterization Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
Yves Balasko 435–444
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
Vincent Anesi and Daniel J. Seidmann 445–482
Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
 Supplementary appendix
Ying Chen and Hulya Eraslan 483–513
A dynamic theory of electoral competition Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
Marco Battaglini 515–554
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