TE logo
ISSN (e) 1555-7561
(print) 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics
An open-access journal in economic theory
A journal of the
Econometric Society
Main page Submit a paper Join the Econometric Society
Editorial Board
Editor
  • Federico Echenique
Coeditors
  • Mira Frick
  • Pablo Kurlat
  • Juuso Toikka
  • Rakesh Vohra
Associate Editors
  • Scott Ashworth
  • Sarah Auster
  • Mariagiovanna Baccara
  • Marco Bassetto
  • Francis Bloch
  • Simon Board
  • Jaroslav Borovicka
  • Florian Brandl
  • Benjamin Brooks
  • Christopher P. Chambers
  • Eduardo Davila
  • Geoffroy de Clippel
  • Eddie Dekel
  • Tommaso Denti
  • Laura Doval
  • Ignacio Esponda
  • Alex Frankel
  • Yingni Guo
  • Kevin He
  • Benjamin Hébert
  • Johannes Hörner
  • Fuhito Kojima
  • Vijay Krishna
  • Nicolas S. Lambert
  • Stephan Lauermann
  • Benjamin Lester
  • Shengwu Li
  • Annie Liang
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Jay Lu
  • George J. Mailath
  • Moritz Meyer-ter-vehn
  • Ezra Oberfield
  • Marcin Pęski
  • John K.-H. Quah
  • Philipp Sadowski
  • Todd D. Sarver
  • Uzi Segal
  • Ran Spiegler
  • Colin Stewart
  • Satoru Takahashi
  • Juuso Välimäki
  • Pierre-Olivier Weill
  • Alexander Westkamp
  • Thomas Wiseman

Acknowledgments
Theoretical Economics publishes leading research in economic theory. It is published by the Econometric Society four times a year, in January, May, July, and November. All content is freely available. It is included in the Social Sciences Citation Index.

Current Issue: Volume 20, Issue 4 (November 2025)

Table of Contents

Articles

Competitive and revenue-optimal pricing with budgets
       Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg, and Edwin Lock
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1135–1153
Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs
       Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1155–1180
Fostering collaboration
       Joyee Deb, Aditya V. Kuvalekar, and Elliot Lipnowski
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1181–1211
Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
       Daniel Rappoport
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1213–1246
Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
       Ian Ball and Deniz Kattwinkel
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1247–1284
Safe implementation
       Malachy J. Gavan and Antonio Penta
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1285–1322
Screening for breakthroughs
       Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1323–1365
Ex-post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism
       Matthew D. Adler, Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato, and Kohei Kamaga
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1367–1410
Existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in search-and-matching models: tu and ntu
       Christopher Sandmann and Nicolas Bonneton
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1411–1460
Non-recursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach
       Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky
Abstract  PRINT  VIEW
1461–1520
Through 2016, the order of papers within each issue is the order of receipt of the final versions. From 2017, within each issue papers are ordered by their length.

The print and view links lead to pdf files of the papers with the same content. The format of the versions in the view links is optimized for on-screen viewing.
Papers in this issue have on average been downloaded from 1882 distinct IP addresses. (For each paper, downloads since the paper was first made available as a "Paper to appear" are included in this number.)

PREVIOUS ISSUE      BROWSE ALL ISSUES

Papers to appear

The following papers have been accepted and will appear in future issues. The links below lead to the final accepted papers in their working paper formats. The papers will be copyedited and typeset for publication.

  • Yaron Azrieli and John N. Rehbeck, Marginal stochastic choice
  • Daehyun Kim and Ichiro Obara, Asymptotic value of monitoring structures in stochastic games
  • Francesco Squintani, Strategic disclosure in networks
  • Michael Greinecker and Michael Andrew Nielsen, Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?: Correction
  • Maxwell Rosenthal, Simple incentives and diverse beliefs
  • Felix Kubler, Larry Selden, and Xiao Wei, Time consistency, temporal resolution indifference and the separation of time and risk (Supplementary appendix)
  • Teddy Mekonnen, How to segment a search market: information design and directed search
  • Navin Kartik and Weijie Zhong, Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection
  • Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman, Markovian persuasion
  • Royi Jacobovic, Yehuda John Levy, and Eilon Solan, Bayesian games with nested information
  • Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel, and Barton L. Lipman, Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence
  • Yair Antler and Benjamin Bachi, Naive calibration
  • Boli Xu, Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability
  • Xiaoye Liao and Michal Szkup, Coordination with sequential information acquisition
  • Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima, Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?
  • Markus Möller, Transparent matching mechanisms
  • Marco Battaglini, Chaos and unpredictability with time inconsistent policy makers

Register to be notified when issues are published

To be notified of the publication of new issues, please register by completing the form on our registration page.

Privacy Statement

The names and email addresses entered in forms on this website will be used exclusively for the purposes of the journal and will not be made available for any other purpose or to any other party.
  Follow EconTheory on X   Follow EconTheory on Bluesky  
About Theoretical Economics
Submit a paper
Referee guidelines
Journal Content Search

Advanced search

Browse

Login

Endorsed by